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Abstract 
Purpose: To develop and validate a self-report measure of individual juror decision making within 
criminal trials, based on theoretical features set out in the Story Model of juror decision making.  
Methods: The Juror Decision Scale (JDS) and Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual 
Aggression (AMMSA) measure were completed by 324 jury-eligible participants split across 27 
jury panels, after observing a rape trial re-enactment high in ecological validity. Dimensionality 
and construct validity of the JDS was investigated using traditional confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) techniques alongside confirmatory bifactor analysis at two time points (individual juror 
verdict decisions pre- and post-deliberation). Three competing models of the JDS were specified 
and tested using Mplus with maximum likelihood robust estimation.  
Results: Bifactor model with three meaningful factors (complainant believability, defendant 
believability, decision confidence) was the best fit for the data at both decision points. Good 
composite reliability and differential predictive validity were observed for the three JDS subscales. 
Conclusion: Alongside demonstrating its multidimensional conceptualisation, the JDS 
development permits future empirical testing of the Story Model theoretical assertions surrounding 
juror decision making. Present findings also provide early evidence of a certainty principle 
assessment process governing individual verdict decision formation. Theoretical and practical 
applications are discussed. 
Keywords: Juror Decision Scale (JDS); Story model; Confirmatory factor analysis; Differential 
predictive validity; Jury decision making, certainty principles. 
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Introduction  
Numerous theoretical models have been advanced in an attempt to explain how jurors 
arrive at verdict decisions within criminal trials. Competing explanations differ in their attempt to 
account for individual decision formation or collective group decision-making, which constitute 
two distinct processing tasks jurors must undertake throughout the duration of a trial. Yet despite 
distinctions between juror-versus-jury level decision models, most theorising to date has centred 
upon individual juror processing. Dual process models VXFK DV (SVWHLQ¶V  &RJQLWLYH-
Experiential Self-Theory, alongside 7YHUVN\ DQG .DKQHPDQ¶V (1974) heuristic processing 
shortcuts, have gained plentiful support, with empirical explorations reporting features of both 
models to account for many processing stages jurors undertake (Brekke & Borgida, 1988; 
Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; Kovera McAuliff, & Hebert, 1999; Krauss, 
Lieberman, & Olson, 2004; Lieberman, 2002; Mears & Bacon, 2009). Bayesian models have also 
been drawn upon, proposing a process by which individual jurors judge discrete pieces of 
information upon a theorised continuum of guilt. Juror weightings are posited to shift as every new 
piece of evidence is independently assessed, allowing an overall probability of guilt to be 
constructed by the end of trial (Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, 1978). Nonetheless, despite 
aforementioned explanations accounting for many processes thought to underlie juror decisions, 
no theory has been so widely adopted or comprehensive in its account of juror decision formation 
as PenniQJWRQDQG+DVWLH¶V1992) Story Model.  
Attempting to provide a complete account of the decision-making process undertaken, the 
Story Model posits jurors to be actively engaged in a narrative construction of information 
surrounding a case. A combination of evidence presented during trial, existing world knowledge, 
and preconceived attitudes are said to be used by jurors to construct one or more possible 
interpretations of the event, termed stories (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Personal inferences and 
pre-existing bias are considered most likely to be incorporated within the narrative interpretations 
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jurors construct when key elements of the stories are not presented as evidence (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1988). Thus, trials lacking compelling evidence, including CCTV or eyewitness testimony, 
appear most at risk from juror bias. In essence, the theory suggests that when hearing competing 
accounts of the same incident during trial, typically including one version put forward by a 
defendant and an alternative account put forward by a complainant, individual jurors construct 
differing narrative interpretations of what they believe actually occurred. At the end of trial and 
prior to deliberation, jurors then select one such narrative as the dominant, accepted version of 
events, they believe to be true (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Yet before this occurs, competing 
stories or narratives are thought to undergo three differing phases of processing termed; story 
construction, verdict representation, and story classification.  
 Whilst the verdict representation phase relates WRMXURU¶VDELOLW\WRLGHQWLI\DQGXQGHUVWDQG
differing verdict options available and the story classification SKDVH VXUURXQGV MXURU¶V
determination of which verdict option best matches the story accepted (according to the perceived 
goodness of fit between the two), the story construction phase is considered most important for 
individual decision formation (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Here, jurors are thought to draw 
primarily upon evidence presented during trial, as well as prior knowledge held around what 
typically occurs in similar events, in making sense of the case (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Prior 
knowledge is conceptualised as factual information, alongside assumptions and attitudes jurors 
bring to trial that are relevant to the issues under scrutiny. From the combination of such 
information, competing stories are thought to be concurrently constructed as variants of what may 
have happened in the case, though only one of multiple stories constructed will ultimately be 
selected (Pennington & Hastie, 1992).  
Competing defendant and complainant stories are subsequently assessed by individual 
jurors according to what Pennington and Hastie (1992) term, certainty principles. Thus, a story 
constructed will only be accepted by an individual juror when considered to have adequate:  
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coverage of crucial pieces of evidence integrated within an account (i.e., good fit between evidence 
presented and a given version of events), coherence regarding how consistent (i.e., lacks internal 
contradictions), complete (i.e., no aspects of the story are missing from the evidence available), 
and plausible (i.e., the story is credible and could possibly have happened) a story appears to be, 
and finally the uniqueness of the story, surrounding whether alternative equally credible and 
comprehensive explanations could emerge from the evidence available. Pennington and Hastie 
(1992, 1993) posit only upon satisfying each of these certainty principle elements within the story 
construction stage, will any story be accepted by an individual juror, over other competing 
possibilities. Once one story is accepted and matched to a verdict option available, a verdict 
decision will be made. Taken together, the Story Model considers individual juror decision 
formation is best conceptualised as representing two core factors surrounding, belief in a 
GHIHQGDQW¶VVWRU\DQGEHOLHILQDFRPSODLQDQW¶V story, distinct factors thought to be independently 
ascertained through certainty principle assessments. Consideration of theoretical discussion 
surrounding the role of confidence in MXURUV¶ VWRU\ DVVHVVPHQWV DQG YHUGLFW FODVVLILFDWLRQV
(Pennington & Hastie, 1993), as well as the importance attributed to confidence in decision 
pathways more broadly within jury literature (Hawkins & Scherr, 2017; Matthews, Hancock, & 
Briggs, 2004; Willmott & Sherretts, 2016), a third theorised factor of decision confidence is also 
conceptualised. 
Empirical Support for the Story Model 
 (DUO\DWWHPSWVWRH[DPLQHMXURUV¶PHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIHYLGHQFHoffered initial support 
of a story construction process underpinning juror decision making. In one study, Pennington and 
Hastie (1986) exposed participants to a videotaped re-enactment of a murder trial and asked mock 
jurors to provide individual verdict decisions, before probing the decision-making process 
undertaken. Jurors reported constructing evidence into a story structure format in order to make 
sense of the evidence and described a process by which they drew more heavily on evidence that 
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supported their accepted version of events than other evidence presented. In fact, the authors found 
evidence presented during mock trials that did not directly fit with the story constructed, was much 
less likely to be discussed by the jurors, regardless of its individual merit. Where important 
HOHPHQWV RI D MXURU¶V VWRU\ZHUH QRW SUHVHQWHG DV HYLGHQFH WKH UHVHDUFKHUV IRXQGPRFN MXURUV
simply made inferences based upon personal experiences and assumptions, ensuring the accepted 
story was deemed coherent and complete. Adopting an alternative approach, Pennington and 
Hastie (1988) presented mock jurors with a written summary of a case which they were required 
to render a verdict upon before undertaking a memory recognition test of trial evidence. Results 
displayed memory of trial information was best when information being recalled was consistent 
with a story matching the verdict decision participants had made and poorest for story inconsistent 
evidence. Further, in studies that varied the presentation of evidence from the traditional narrative 
format (where witnesses were asked questions about the event sequentially), to an item-by-item 
format (where witnesses were asked about discrete aspects of the case non-sequentially), results 
displayed presentation order not only differentially affectHGDMXURU¶VPHPRU\RIHYLGHQFH but led 
to different verdicts being returned in respect of the same case. The traditional narrative format 
was found to allow easier credibility assessments of witness testimony to be undertaken than item-
by-item evidence presentation (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The authors report that when asked 
to make global judgements of the evidence (rather than item-by-item evaluations), jurors 
seemingly adopted a system of certainty principle processing of competing witness stories before 
deciding upon a chosen verdict (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The authors made this assertion 
based upon qualitative responses mock jurors gave when asked to describe their decision-making 
process and thus more objective, quantitative analysis of the data gathered was not possible. To 
date, all studies report jurors¶ PHQWDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI WULDO HYLGHQFH were underpinned by 
causally connected sequences of events, in which selected testimony appeared to be constructed 
LQWR VWRU\ IRUPDWV :KLOVW 3HQQLQJWRQ DQG +DVWLH¶V  VWXG\ GLVSOD\HG WKH VDPH HYLGHQFH
would be considered stronger when presented in a story format, the greatest influence upon final 
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decisions was found to be the strength of one story when compared to another (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1988, 1993). Contemporary studies appear to support the Story Model assertions 
VXUURXQGLQJMXURU¶VQDUUDWLYHconstruction of evidence underpinning individual decision-making 
(Blume, Johnson, & Paavola, 2007; Huntley & Costanzo, 2003). Ellison and Munro¶V (2015) 
qualitative examination of the role of written judicial instructions upon juror comprehension of 
legal guidelines also explored the process by which mock jurors reached verdict decisions. 
Analysis of deliberations led the legal scholars to again conclude a narrative construction of trial 
evidence was apparent.  
However, the Story Model is not beyond criticism. Pennington and Hastie (1992) offer 
little explanation surrounding the process by which individual juror decisions remain stable or 
change during group-deliberations and provide no account of the exact verdict decision-making 
pURFHVV XQGHUWDNHQ E\ LQGLYLGXDO MXURU¶V GXULQJ RU SRVW-deliberation. With much juror-level 
research dismissed as unrepresentative of collective agreed jury-level decisions, ultimately 
required within criminal trials before a verdict can be given (Darbyshire, 2011; Kapardis, 2014), 
the need to examine how individual juror decisions made pre-deliberation may interact with the 
group deliberation process remains apparent. Despite being considered crucial to the acceptance 
of one witness story over another, no researchers have directly empirically tested whether certainty 
principle assessments underpin the decisions individual jurors make during trial. Authors have 
sought to substantiate the premise that jurors construct competing stories during trial, however to 
date no researchers have directly sought to test whether the certainty principles set out within the 
Story Model do in fact govern the acceptance of one story over another. Individual constructs 
thought to be comprised within the story construction phase have been tested in isolation; including 
plausibility judgements between criminal narratives (Canter, Grieve, Nicol, & Benneworth, 2003; 
Jackson, 1996), as well as narrative coherence and completeness assessments of guilt (Voss & Van 
Dyke, 2001; Yale, 2013). Further, nRHPSLULFDODWWHPSWWRGDWHKDVHVWDEOLVKHGZKHWKHUDMXURU¶V
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JUHDWHUEHOLHILQDFRPSODLQDQWRUGHIHQGDQW¶VVWRU\KDVDQ\VLJQLILFDQWDVVRFLDWLRQwith the verdict 
decision jurors ultimately make.  
Current Study  
Whilst the Story Model provides a detailed conceptualisation of the decision-making stages 
thought to underlie a juror¶s decision to vote guilty or not guilty and remains the dominant 
explanation within the field, a lack of empirical research exists which seeks to verify important 
features of the theory. In particular, a central component termed certainty principles have, to the 
DXWKRUV¶ knowledge, never been empirically tested or verified. Therefore, the aim of the current 
study was to develop a valid measure of individual juror decision making relative to criminal trials, 
directly integrating theoretical features of Pennington and Hastie¶V 1992) Story Model into an 
empirically testable scale. Accordingly, the factorial structure and construct validity of the scale 
developed, termed the Juror Decision Scale (JDS) (complainant believability, defendant 
believability, decision confidence), was tested using confirmatory factor analysis and confirmatory 
bi-factorial techniques pre and post juror deliberation. Composite reliability and differential 
predictive validity of the JDS was also investigated. 
 
Methods 
Sample  
A self-selected opportunity sample of 352 participants were recruited from a large urban 
town in the North of England. Based upon recent census data, the town has a population of 
approximately 140,000 people, making it the 11th largest town in Great Britain (Office for National 
Statistics, 2016). Of this population, electoral polls suggest around 96,000 live within the 
parliamentary constituency of the town, where approximately 75,400 are aged 18 and above, 
meaning that such individuals are eligible to vote in government elections and thus, in principle, 
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eligible for jury service (Electoral Calculus, 2015). Targeting prospective participants through 
advertising posters distributed throughout the town centre and university campus, the present 
sample consisted of members of the general population, as well as undergraduate and postgraduate 
students. All volunteers were screened prior to participation in line with English juror eligibility 
criteria (i.e., age, residential status, criminal history, mental health), with most of those excluded 
from partaking declined on the basis of age or lack of permanent residency status. Due to the non-
attendance of eight participants for their allocated mock trial, the data from three entire jury panels 
were removed prior to analysis. The remaining sample was therefore 324 participants, distributed 
across 27 separate mock trials, each with 12 jurors in total. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 
70 years old (M = 24.86, SD = 9.34), and comprised of 210 females (64.8%) and 114 males 
(35.2%). In total, 213 participants reported their ethnicity as Caucasian (65.7%), 58 reported being 
of South Asian descent (17.9%), and 53 as Black Afro-Caribbean (16.4%). Most participants 
UHSRUWHGKDYLQJDOHYHORIHGXFDWLRQEHORZDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHZLWK a smaller proportion 
reporting being educated to at least university level (24.0%). The demographic profile of study 
participants was overall representative of the general population of the local region surrounding 
ethnicity and educational attainment. All participants gave up their time voluntarily and received 
only a gift token of nominal value for taking part. 
Study procedure  
Attempting to improve upon methodological limitations present within much jury research 
to date, typically utilising brief written vignette trial scenarios and lacking any group deliberation 
element (for a review see McCabe, Krauss & Lieberman, 2010), the present study sought to 
undertake mock trials in a manner exhibiting greater ecological validity. Accordingly, study 
procedures were designed to reflect the same sequential stages undertaken within genuine criminal 
jury trials. Following consultation with an expert panel of criminal justice practitioners including, 
an experienced Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyer, a practising criminal barrister, and three 
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senior police investigators from two differing British police forces, a rape case collectively deemed 
to be typical of those often brought before the courts was selected as a case most likely to elucidate 
the greatest understanding surrounding how jurors reach decisions during trial. All panel members 
independently identified the same three features as present within many contested rape cases 
(voluntary intoxication, lack of independent witnesses, previous acquaintanceship with the alleged 
perpetrator) and accordingly it was decided that these components should form the basis of the 
case transcript selected for experimentation. A systematic trawl of legal case databases LexisNexis 
and the British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BILII) were conducted adopting the 
following search criteria; transcripts were required to include (1) voluntary intoxication, previous 
acquaintanceship, and a general lack of independent witnesses; (2) the sexual offence of rape was 
recorded; (3) sufficient detail surrounding the alleged offence and the events preceding/following 
the rape incident, as well as the competing accounts put forward by the complainant and defendant; 
(4) largely evidentially ambiguous, meaning that roughly equal information corroborated and 
FRQWUDGLFWHG ERWK SDUWLHV¶ DFFRXQWV RI ZKDW KDSSHQHG $V WKHVH GDWDEDVHV VWRUH JHQXLQH WULDO
transcript information of cases that have previously been heard at trial within the UK, the legal 
threshold of any case selected had been met, with regards to the evidence available being deemed 
significant enough to warrant a criminal trial. Cases which met the stipulated criteria were 
qualitatively reviewed until a total fifteen cases were shortlisted. These transcripts were then 
further scrutinised on the basis of including enough detail of the legal arguments put forward by 
the prosecution and defence, such that mock trial re-enactment would be possible. 
Having selected one case that matched the aforementioned criteria, the trial transcript was 
subsequently reduced in length to allow a shorter mock trial scenario to be devised. A clear 
narrative was constructed relative to the case, whereby a summary of the undisputed facts, the 
FRPSODLQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVDFRQGHQVHGYHUVLRQRIERWKWKH
SURVHFXWLRQDQGGHIHQFHTXHVWLRQLQJRIERWKSDUWLHVDQGWKHMXGJH¶VLQVWUXFWLRQVZHUHVFripted.  
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,QRUGHUWKDWWKH MXGJH¶V LQVWUXFWLRQVZHUHDFFXUDWHO\VXPPDULVHGIURPWKHRULJLQDOWULDO
transcript, as well as ensuring all evidence was in accordance with English law, lawyers from the 
expert CJS panel were again consulted. Next, this scripted scenario was developed into a 
videotaped mock trial simulation and thus a local filmmaker, as well as professional actors were 
recruited for the roles of the complainant (female), defendant (male), and court clerk. Finally, 
experienced criminal lawyers were enlisted to take on the role of the legal professionals including 
the role of the judge, to present mock-juror participants with the case. Special permission was 
granted to record the mock trial recreation within a genuine courtroom in the North of England 
and the duration of the final condensed version was 25 minutes long. 
Adopting an experimental design, participants were recruited to take part in one of 27 
replications of the same mock trial. In an attempt to simulate the randomisation of mock jurors 
into respective trials, participants were assigned at random to different mock trials listed for 
experimentation over the coming weeks. On the day of experimentation, participants were first 
asked to complete a number of psychosocial assessments within the context of a mock courtroom. 
Immediately after, the twelve-person jury panels were shown the 25-minute videotaped rape trial 
re-enactment on a large screen within the mock courtroom. In an attempt to ensure that participants 
were actively attending to the video and approached the decision-making task in a similar way to 
that of a real jury, mock jurors were informed that whilst the video was a re-enactment, the content 
therein related to that of a genuine rape allegation that had previously gone to trial and that all of 
the testimony they would hear was drawn from evidence presented within the real case. Once the 
trial video had concluded and mock jurors had heard all testimony and evidence in the case, 
participants were asked to remain in their seats prior to deliberation. Each participant then 
completed the JDS and recorded their preferred verdict ³How do you find the defendant on the 
charge of RaSH"*XLOW\RU1RW*XLOW\´) allowing pre-deliberation individual juror decisions to be 
assessed. Jurors were reminded not to discuss the case until they were in the deliberation room. 
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Next, in accordance with genuine trial deliberation procedures, participants were 
reconvened within a separate jury deliberation room where they were asked to collectively discuss 
the case in an attempt to reach a unanimous verdict. An experimenter was not present in the room 
during deliberations. Where participants agreed upon a unanimous verdict within the allotted one-
hour time frame, they were reconvened within the mock courtroom to render their verdict. Where 
participants were not unanimous after one-hour deliberating, an extra thirty minutes was provided 
in an attempt to reach a majority verdict, after which point all 27 jury panels had successfully 
arrived at verdict, recorded by an experimenter. Finally, jurors were again asked to complete the 
JDS and record a final verdict preference (Guilty/Not Guilty), allowing post-deliberation juror 
decisions to be assessed. Before doing so, jurors were instructed that the verdict decisions they 
were being asked to make related to them as an individual and may therefore not necessarily reflect 
the collective verdict that had just been returned. Once completed, participants were debriefed and 
thanked for partaking. In total, each mock trial experiment lasted between 120 and 180 minutes 
from arrival to debriefing.  
Scale Development   
In designing the JDS as a measure of individual juror verdict decision-making, we sought 
to incorporate theoretical features termed certainty principles described in Pennington and 
+DVWLH¶V6WRU\0RGHO6SHFLILFDOO\WKHPRGHOVXJJHVWVFRPSHWLQJYHUVLRQVRIHYHQWVLH
the complainant versus defendant stories), are independently and implicitly assessed by individual 
jurors according to a number of prescribed certainty principles. Item generation for the JDS relied 
GLUHFWO\ XSRQ WKH 6WRU\ 0RGHO¶V WKHRUHWLFDO FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI WKHVH FHUWDLQW\ SULQFLSOHV $V
such, seven items pertaining to the extent to which DMXURUUHVSRQGHQWIHOWDFRPSODLQDQW¶VVWRU\
had coverage, coherence, consistency, completeness, plausibility, uniqueness, and overall 
believability, were devised. Seven iGHQWLFDOLWHPVSHUWDLQLQJLQVWHDGWRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWRU\ZHUH
also included in the scale. In accordance with the story model assertions, these complainant versus 
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defendant certainty principle items were hypothesised to constitute two separate dimensions within 
WKHVFDOHZKLFKLQOLQHZLWKWKH3HQQLQJWRQDQG+DVWLH¶VWKHRU\VKould be highest for the 
individual whose story is matched to a verdict decision. Consideration of theoretical discussion 
VXUURXQGLQJWKHUROHRIFRQILGHQFHLQMXURUV¶VWRU\DVVHVVPHQWVYHUGLFWFODVVLILFDWLRQV3HQQLQJWRQ
& Hastie, 1993), two global items pertaining to decision confidence were also included, 
hypothesised to comprise a separate dimension within the scale. In total, the scale developed 
comprised of 16-items distributed across three hypothesised dimensions (Complainant 
Believability, Defendant Believability, Decision Confidence) (see Table 4 for all scale items). 
Where the Story Model is accurate in its theoretical account of the role of certainty principles 
underpinning individual juror decision formation, higher scores would be expected to be found on 
the complainant believability sub-scale for jurors who returned a guilty verdict, and higher on the 
defendant believability sub-scale where jurors retuned a not guilty verdict. Therefore, all JDS scale 
LWHPV PHDVXUH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ VHOI-reported assessments of how believable they determine a 
complainant and defendant to be, having heard all evidence in a particular jury trial (or mock trial 
for research purposes), as well as their self-reported confidence relating to the individual verdict 
decision made in a given case.   
Measures 
The Juror Decision Scale (JDS) is a 16-item self-report measure designed to assess 
individual juror decision making (see Table 4 for all scale items). The measure consists of three 
subscales; Complainant Believability (seven items), Defendant Believability (seven items), and 
Decision Confidence (two items), with all items scored on a 5-SRLQW/LNHUWVFDOH ³QRWDWDOO´
WR ³H[WUHPHO\´. Higher scores on the Complainant Believability sub-scale indicates greater 
juror/respRQGHQWEHOLHILQWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVWRU\ZLWKORZHUVFRUHVLQGLFDWLQJUHGXFHGEHOLHILQ
a complaints account. Higher scores on the Defendant Believability sub-scale indicates greater 
MXURUUHVSRQGHQW EHOLHI LQ WKHGHIHQGDQW¶V VWRU\ZLWK ORZHU VFRUHV LQGLcating a reduced belief. 
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Higher scores on the Decision Confidence subscale indicates greater juror/respondent confidence 
in the accuracy of the verdict decision given. All scale items are measured according to the 
individual juror/UHVSRQGHQWV¶ decisions relative to the evidence heard within a particular case or 
trial. The JDS should be administered pre and post group deliberation. 
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA; Gerger, Kley, 
Bohner, & Siebler, 2007) is a 30-item unidimensional self-report inventory developed to measure 
attitudes held towards rape and sexual aggression in diverse populations HJLWHP³If a woman 
invites a man to her home for a cup of coffee after a night out this means that she wants to have 
sex´DQGLWHP³Many women tend to misinterpret a well-meant gesture as a sexual assault". 
Responses are measured on a seven-SRLQW /LNHUW VFDOH    ³FRPSOHWHO\ GLVDJUHH´ WR   
³FRPSOHWHO\ DJUHH´7RWDO VFRUHV UDQJH IURP WR, with higher scores indicating greater 
DFFHSWDQFHRIP\WKVVXUURXQGLQJVH[XDODJJUHVVLRQ&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD 0.92).   
Analytical Procedure  
 To investigate the dimensionality and construct validity of the JDS, traditional 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) techniques and confirmatory bifactor analysis procedures 
(Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010) were undertaken at both verdict decision time points (VD1 ± 
pre-deliberation and VD2 ± post-deliberation). Three alternative models of the JDS were specified 
and assessed using Mplus 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) with maximum likelihood robust (MLR) 
estimation. The CFA was used to determine factor loadings and identify the best factorial structure. 
 At both verdict decision time points, Model 1 is a one-factor solution, where all 16 JDS 
items load onto a single latent factor. Model 2 is a correlated three-factor solution, where items 
load on the complainant believability factor (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), defendant believability 
factor (items 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15), and decision confidence factor (items 1 and 16). Model 
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3 (see Figure 1) is a bifactor conceptualisation with one general factor (all items) of juror decision 
making, alongside three subordinate factors as described in Model 2.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 The overall fit of each model and the relative fit between the three differing models were 
assessed using a range of goodness-of-fit indices. The Chi-square statistic (Ȥ2), Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI; Cronbach, 1990), Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), Root-Mean-
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) with the associated 90% confidence 
interval (90% CI), Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) were reported for all models. For CFI and TLI, values above or 
approaching 0.95 are indicative of good model fit and above 0.90 acceptable model fit (Bentler, 
1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Likewise, for RMSEA and SRMR, values less than 0.05 suggest good 
model fit and below .08 acceptable model fit (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999). For BIC values 
comparing alternate models, the lowest value is indicative of the best fitting model (Nylund, 
Asparouhov, & Muthen, 2007). 
 )LQDOO\GXHWRFULWLFLVPVVXUURXQGLQJ&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDFRHIILFLHQWLQGLFDWRUVRILQWHUQDO
consistency (Raykov, 1997; 1998), composite reliability was used within the present analysis to 
assess internal reliability of the JDS factors, with values above 0.60 typically considered 
acceptable (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). 
 
Results 
Frequencies of individual juror verdict decisions pre- and post-deliberation and collective 
group decisions are presented in Table 1. Whilst the number of participants who recorded a guilty 
verdict decreased post-deliberation with the number of individual not guilty verdict preferences 
16 
 
increasing, results of a McNemar's Chi-square test for association displayed no significant change 
occurred between pre- and post-deliberation, F2 (1, N = 324) = 2.16, p = .142. Overall, most trials 
resulted in a collective not guilty verdict returned (N = 22) with just a minority of jury panels 
returning a guilty verdict (N = 5). 
Descriptive statistics for the three JDS factors (Complainant Believability, Defendant 
Believability, and Decision Confidence) at both verdict decision time points (VD1 = pre-
deliberation; VD2 = post-deliberation), are presented in Table 2.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Fit indices for three alternative models of the JDS at both verdict decision time points (VD1, VD2) 
are presented in Table 3. At both time points, the one-factor model and correlated three-factor 
model were rejected, based upon exhibiting CFI and TLI values considerably below the 0.95 
approximate level of acceptance (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999) and RMSEA and SRMR 
values considerably above the 0.05 level of acceptance. Taken together the combination of fit 
statistics indicate the bifactor model of the JDS provides the best fit to the data at both verdict 
decision time points: VD1 (CFI = 0.94, TLI = 0.92, SRMR = 0.04, RMSEA = 0.07 [90%CI = 
0.05/0.08], BIC = 11119.99), VD2 CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.94, SRMR = 0.04, RMSEA = 0.07 [90%CI 
= 0.05/0.08], BIC = 10700.38). Notably, the BIC statistic for the bifactor model, at both verdict 
decision time points, was lower than that displayed for all alternative models. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
The appropriateness of the bifactor model of the JDS can also be determined through examination 
of factor loadings for statistical significance. Inspection of the factor loadings for the three JDS 
17 
 
factors (Table 4 and 5) provides clear evidence of the appropriateness of including these latent 
factors in the scoring of the JDS. Overall, standardized factor loadings are higher for three 
grouping factors than for the general factor. Therefore, all three JDS subscales (complainant 
believability, defendant believability, and decision confidence) should be considered in research 
and practical application. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Insert Table 5 about here 
The correlations between the three JDS factors, relative to Verdict Decision 1, were low 
(complainant believability and decision confidence r = 0.10, p > 0.05; complainant believability 
and defendant believability r = -0.30, p < 0.001; defendant believability and decision confidence 
r = 0.14, p < 0.05) indicating little overlap between the variables. Correlations between the JDS 
latent factors relative to Verdict Decision 2 were also low (complainant believability and decision 
confidence r = 0.05, p > 0.05; complainant believability and defendant believability r = -0.36, p < 
0.001; defendant believability and decision confidence r = 0.25, p < 0.001) further indicating little 
overlap between the variables. Nonetheless, whilst there appears to be no significant overlap 
between JDS variables at either decision points, assessing differential predictive validity of a 
multidimensional scale is recommended (Boduszek & Debowska, 2016; Carmines & Zeller, 
1979). In the present analysis, this involved ensuring that the three dimensions of the JDS were 
associated differentially with external variables.  
Table 6 displays the results of the regression analyses at both decision time points. In 
relation to Verdict Decision 1, complainant believability forms a significant negative relationship 
with rape attitudes (AMMSA), whereas a significant positive relationship is observed between 
defendant believability and AMMSA scores. While negatively correlated, decision confidence was 
non-significantly related to AMMSA scores. For Verdict Decision 2, AMMSA was again 
significantly negatively correlated with the complainant believability dimension and significantly 
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positively correlated with defendant believability. Though positively correlated, decision 
confidence was non-significantly related to AMMSA scores. Both pre- and post-deliberation 
logistic regression results display a significant positive relationship between complainant 
believability and guilty verdict selections, whereas a significant negative relationship is observed 
between defendant believability and guilty verdict selections. Decision confidence was positively 
associated with guilty verdicts at both decision points, though this relationship was statistically 
non-significant. These differential correlations between JDS subscales and external variables 
confirm the correctness of multidimensional solution of JDS. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Internal reliability of the JDS factors was calculated using composite reliability in place of 
WUDGLWLRQDO&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDDVVXJJHVWHGE\%RGXV]HN	'HERZVND5D\NRY
Using the formula displayed below where; CR = composite reliability of the factor score, ȜL = 
standardised factor loading, and Var (ڙi) = standard error variance, results demonstrate good 
internal reliability for the JDS factors pre- and post-deliberation. 
 
 
 
At Verdict Decision 1, results displayed that confidence in decision = 0.82, complainant 
believability = 0.70, and defendant believability = 0.79, alongside the general factor = 0.74, 
exhibited good internal reliability. Likewise, at Verdict Decision 2, confidence in decision = 0.83, 
complainant believability = 0.72, and defendant believability = 0.85, as well as the general factor 
= 0.79, exhibited good internal reliability. 
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Discussion 
3HQQLQJWRQDQG+DVWLH¶V6WRU\0RGHOSURYLGHVDGHWDLOHGFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKH
information processing stages thought to underlie juror verdict decisions. Yet whilst credited for 
its comprehensiveness and widely regarded as the dominant explanation of juror-level decision 
making, researchers are yet to empirically test and verify important theoretical features underlying 
the model. One central feature suggests whilst hearing competing defendant and complainant 
accounts during trial, jurors assess the extent to which they believe such stories according to a 
subscribed set of certainty principles. Based upon the varying extent to which each story is 
considered to be consistent, complete, and plausible (amongst other certainty principles), the 
theory posits competing stories are rated in terms of overall believability, with the account deemed 
WREHPRVWEHOLHYDEOHXVHGWRFRQVWUXFWWKHLQGLYLGXDOMXURU¶VFKRVHQYHUGLFWGHFLVLRQ<HWZLWKQR
prior inventory in existence, the need to develop a self-report scale directly integrating the 
theoretical certainty principles into an empirically testable measure remained apparent. The main 
objective of the current exploration was therefore to develop a valid and reliable scale permitting 
the Story Model¶s conceptualisation of individual juror decision formation (certainty principles) 
to be examined. Another objective was to evaluate the dimensionality and construct validity of the 
proposed Juror Decision Scale (JDS) using confirmatory techniques. Specifically, confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and confirmatory bi-factor analysis was undertaken upon a large community 
sample of mock-jurors following their exposure to a simulated rape trial and completion of the 
JDS pre and post-deliberation.  
 It has previously been suggested that in order to fully explore the factorial structure of a 
proposed measure, a number of alternate conceptually sound solutions should be tested (Boduszek 
& Debowska, 2016; Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010). In the current study three alterative models 
of the JDS were identified and tested at both pre- and post-deliberation verdict decision time points 
(a one-factor model, a three-factor model, and a bifactor model with three grouping factors), using 
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confirmatory techniques. Results displayed that the only acceptable solution for the 16-item JDS 
at both verdict decision points (as indicated by all model fit statistics) was the bifactor model with 
three grouping factors (Complainant Believability, Defendant Believability, and Decision 
Confidence), while controlling for a general factor. Since the majority of covariation between the 
observed indicators were explained by the three grouping factors, at both decision points, these 
factors formed the basis for creating the instrument¶s subscales (see Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 
2010). According to Boduszek and Debowska (2016), when compared with traditional CFA 
procedures, bifactor modelling allows the validity of a single factor to be assessed alongside 
incorporating elements of construct multi-dimensionality. Adopting this approach subsequently 
elucidated the JDS as a multi-dimensional concept.  
 Further, whilst the three JDS factors displayed little overlap with one another, the need to 
establish differential predictive validity between sub-scales on a multidimensional scale is 
considered advantageous (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Ensuring sub-scales measure separate 
theoretical, as opposed to statistical, factors by establishing differential predictive validity thereby 
allows conceptual distinctiveness to be reliably ascertained (Boduszek & Debowska, 2016). 
Indeed, the present results displayed that across both verdict decision time points, the three JDS 
factors correlated differently with external measures. For example, complainant believability was 
significantly negatively associated with rape myth acceptance (as measured using the AMMSA; 
Gerger et al., 2007) both pre-deliberation (ȕ = -0.16) and post-deliberation (ȕ = -0.24). Conversely, 
defendant believability significantly positively associated with AMMSA scores, both upon pre-
deliberation (ȕ = 0.23) and post-deliberation (ȕ = 0.16) verdict decisions. Such relationships 
display the important role that pre-trial bias appears to have upon juror decision making, with rape 
attitudes shown to be directly associated with juror beliefs in a defendant¶s account of an alleged 
rape, though unsurprisingly, not with that of the complainant. Such findings directly support those 
reported in prior research in that, greater acceptance of sexually aggressive myths appears to 
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reduce a MXURU¶V propensity to believe a rape FRPSODLQDQW¶V WHVWLPRQ\ 'LQRV %XUURZHV
Hammond, & Cunliffe, 2015; Ellison & Munro, 2010; Finch & Munro, 2005; Pollard, 1992; Raitt 
& Zeedyk. 1997; Temkin & Krahe, 2008; Whatley, 1996). Relative to mock jurors¶ individual 
verdict decisions both prior to (OR = 1.62) and following group deliberation (OR = 1.45), 
complainant believability was also shown to be significantly positively associated with guilty 
verdict selections, whereas defendant believability was instead, significantly negatively associated 
with guilty verdict decisions pre- (OR = 0.68) and post-deliberation (OR = 0.78). Particularly 
LQWHUHVWLQJO\WKLVLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHJUHDWHUDMXURU¶VEHOLHILQDUDSHFRPSODLQDQW¶VWHVWLPRQ\WKH
more likely it is that a guilty verdict will be returned. Yet contrastingly, where a juror exhibits 
JUHDWHUEHOLHILQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWRU\DQRWJXLOW\YHUGLFWLVPRUHSUREDEOHThe totality of such 
ILQGLQJV WKHUHE\SURYLGHV HDUO\ VXSSRUW IRU3HQQLQJWRQ DQG+DVWLH¶V 92) certainty principle 
assertions in that, heightened scores on the complainant believability subscale not only appear to 
co-exist with reduced scores in defendant believability, but when measured in association with 
verdict preferences, appears to be directly predictive of the verdict decision that jurors ultimately 
make. $VVXFKUHVXOWVVXSSRUW3HQQLQJWRQDQG+DVWLH¶VDVVHUWLRQVWKDWSULRUWRVHOHFWLQJD
verdict, jurors appear to assess competing witness accounts in terms of a subscribed set of certainty 
principles, in order to determine which story they deem most believable, before voting 
accordingly. Shown to be significantly associated in opposing directions with rape myth 
acceptance and verdict decisions, assessments made according to certainty principle items 
included in the JDS (surrounding a stories completeness, plausibility, coherence amongst others), 
may not only be drawn upon to decide which story will ultimately be selected (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992) but appear to be influenced in themselves by prior attitudes jurors held. Alternatively 
put, whilst the certainty principle items comprised with the JDS are clearly important determinants 
upon individual decision formation as first theorised, these assessments appear to be influenced in 
themselves by preconceived attitudes jurors hold. 
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 The present study ought to be considered in light of some limitations. Most pertinent is the 
use of self-report measurement that the JDS relies upon in its assessment of juror decisions and as 
such, is associated with possible response bias (see Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 
2003). Additionally, the current study procedure relied upon validating the JDS within the context 
of an English mock rape trial utilising a sample consisting of both community and student mock 
jurors. With debate surrounding the generalisability of student samples within jury research and 
studies reporting differences in both attitudes and cognitive processing styles in student as opposed 
to community samples (for competing reviews see Keller & Weiner, 2011 and Bornstein et al., 
2017), future explorations should see researchers seek to replicate the validation of the JDS within 
a more representative sample. Thus, to HQVXUH WKH VFDOH¶V utility as an accurate assessment of 
certainty principle processing applicable to genuine juror decision making, future samples should 
be drawn from electoral voting and driver registration registers adopting the same process in which 
trial jurors are drawn.  
A number of practical implications emerge from the present research and development of 
WKH-'6)LUVWO\UHVXOWVGLVSOD\JUHDWHUEHOLHILQDFRPSODLQDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVWREHdirectly 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHMXURU¶VSURSHQVLW\WRUHWXUQDJXLOW\YHUGLFWDQd contrastingly, greater belief in 
the defendant¶VDFFRXQWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKMXURU¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRUHWXUQDJXLOW\YHUGLFW:KLOVWLWLV
perhaps routinely taken for granted by justice systems around the world that jurors return verdicts 
which match true and accurate interpretations of the evidence, questions around juror 
comprehension of legal instructions and malicious or biased decision making has long brought this 
assumption into question (Dhami, Lundrigan & Mueller-Johnson, 2015; Ellison & Munro, 2010; 
Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000; Semmler & Brewer, 2002).  Though specific instruction 
comprehension was not directly tested here, the present findings offer justice systems and trial 
judges at least some minor reassurance that individual juror decisions were related and matched to 
juror interpretations of the facts. Whilst further systematic research clearly remains necessary to 
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examine the role of prejudice upon verdict decision making as well as instruction comprehension, 
it appears that jurors do not routinely make verdict selections that do not match the evidence as 
they interpret it.  The development of the JDS also provides an opportunity for criminal justice 
practitioners, in particular trial lawyers, to utilise the measure as a tool for examining likely juror 
interpretations of particular evidence pre-trial. Within a North American trial consultancy context 
where evidence can be shown to mock jurors prior to the genuine case being presented in court, 
the JDS provides a more reliable empirically grounded measure of individual juror decision 
making than traditionally less scientific approaches (see Oostinga & Willmott, 2017; Seltzer, 
2006). Within future research, additional mock trial scenarios varying by crime type and the 
judicial procedures of that country should also be tested to examine the validity of the JDS more 
broadly. Where legislation permits, future explorations should also see researchers seek to 
revalidate the JDS beyond experimental conditions with genuine juror respondents pre and post 
juror-deliberation, particularly within a North American context where jurors can discuss cases 
post-trial. 
Overall, current findings provide an empirical contribution to an almost exclusive 
theoretical literature surrounding the Story Model¶s conceptualisation of the certainty principles. 
Whilst several studies have sought to substantiate claims that jurors construct competing narratives 
during trial and others have examined the importance of particular story features in isolation 
including plausibility, coherence, and completeness upon an assessors determination of credibility 
and guilt (Campbell, Menaker, & King, 2015; Canter, Grieve, Nicol, & Benneworth, 2003; Hine 
& Murphy, 2017; Jackson, 1996; Voss & Van Dyke, 2001; Yale, 2013), no researchers to date 
have developed and validated a complete scale which permits comprehensive testing of such an 
assertion. With existing juror bias scales adequately testing the importance of legal attitudes upon 
verdict decisions (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Lecci & Myers, 2008; Lundrigan, Dhami, & 
MuellerǦJohnson, 2016), the need for an empirical test of the decision making process itself 
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remained apparent. As such, the development of the Juror Decision Scale alongside demonstrating 
its validity and multidimensional conceptualisation, permits future empirical testing of the Story 
Model theoretical assertions surrounding juror decision making and provides early evidence of a 
certainty principle assessment process governing individual juror verdict decision formation. 
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Figure 1. Bifactor model of the JDS; G = general factor of JDM (items 1-16); COMP = 
Complainant Believability (items 2-8); DEF = Defendant Believability (items 9-15); CON = 
Decision Confidence (items 1 & 16)
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Table 1 
Individual and Collective Verdict Decision outcomes (n =324)  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Group Verdict = collective jury panel decision; VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (pre-deliberation); VD2 
= Individual Verdict decision 2 (post-deliberation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision Guilty                       
N (%) 
Not Guilty                
N (%) 
Group Verdict 5 (18.5%) 22 (71.5%) 
Individual VD1  145 (44.8%) 179 (55.2%) 
Individual VD2 133 (41.0%) 191 (59.0%) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for JDS factors pre-deliberation (verdict decision 1), post-deliberation 
(verdict decision 2), and AMMSA. 
Variables M SD Mdn Observed 
Min. 
Observed 
Max. 
JDS VD1      
Decision Confidence 7.09 1.44 7.00 2 10 
Complainant Believability  22.32 4.72 22.00 10 33 
Defendant Believability 22.71 4.29 23.00 8 35 
AMMSA 93.70 25.74 91.00 37 161 
JDS VD2  
     
Decision Confidence 7.57 1.60 8.00 2 10 
Compliant Believability 21.27 5.12 21.00 7 35 
Defendant Believability 23.03 4.83 23.00 10 35 
Note: JDS = Juror Decision Scale; VD1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (that participants made pre-
deliberation); VD2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (that participants made post-deliberation); AMMSA = 
Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score. 
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Table 3 
Fit Indices for Three Alternative Models of the JDS, during stage VD1 (pre-deliberation) and stage VD2 (post-deliberation). 
Stage Models Ȥ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA 90% CI SRMR BIC 
VD1 1. One-factor 1149.72* 104 .49 .41 .16 .17/.19 .16 12034.38 
 2. Correlated 3 factors 813.79* 101 .90 .89 .10 .08/.12 .07 11201.76 
 3. Bifactor 204.42* 85 .94 .92 .07 .05/.08 .04 11119.99 
VD2 1. One-factor 1606.68* 104 .52 .45 .21 .20/.22 .17 11980.06 
 2. Correlated 3 factors 353.86* 101 .90 .89 .09 .08/.10 .07 10785.36 
 3. Bifactor 199.60* 85 .96 .94 .07 .05/.08 .04 10700.38 
Note. JDS = Juror Decision Scale; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; CI = Confidence Interval; df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual7/, 7XFNHU/HZLV,QGH[%,& %D\HVLDQ,QIRUPDWLRQ&ULWHULDȤ2 = chi square goodness 
RIILWVWDWLVWLF,QGLFDWHVȤ2 are statistically significant (p < .05). 
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Table 4 
 
Standardized Factor Loadings for the Three JDS Factors and General Factor (G) pre-deliberation (VD1). 
MCSI-R items G CONF COMP DEF 
7KLQNLQJDERXW\RXULQGLYLGXDOYHUGLFWGHFLVLRQRIµJXLOW\¶RUµQRWJXLOW\¶KRZFRQILGHQWDUH\RXWKDW
you have made the correct decision? 
.14* .82***   
2. How well did the evidence match and cover what the complainant said happened? .34***  .42***  
+RZFRPSOHWHZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVWRU\LQWKHVHQVHWKDWQRDVSHFWVZHUHPLVVLQJRUOHIW
unsupported by the evidence? 
.35***  .54***  
+RZSODXVLEOHZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVLQWKDW\RXWKLQNZKDWWKH\VDLGKDSSHQHGLV
both possible and likely?  
.64***  .43***  
+RZFRKHUHQWZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVWRU\PHDQLQJWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQWVWDJHVGHVFULEHGDVKDSSHQLQJ
were logically connected? 
.49***  .53***  
+RZXQLTXHZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VDFFRXQWLQWKDW\RXIHHOLWZDVWKHRQO\SRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQRIWKH
evidence heard? 
.34***  .61***  
+RZFRQVLVWHQWZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVZLWKWKHHYLGHQFHpresented overall? .36***  .51***  
8. Overall, how much do you believe WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶Vversion of events? .76***  .43***  
9. How well did the evidence match and cover what the defendant said happened? .08   .61*** 
+RZFRPSOHWHZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶Vstory in the sense that no aspects were missing or left unsupported 
by the evidence? 
.03   .73*** 
+RZSODXVLEOHZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVLQWKDW\RXWKLQNZKDWWKH\VDLGKDSSHQHGLV
both possible and likely? 
.57***   .55*** 
12. How FRKHUHQWZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWRU\PHDQLQJWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQWVWDJHVGHVFULEHGDVKDSSHQLQJ
were logically connected? 
.25*   .75*** 
+RZXQLTXHZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDFFRXQWLQWKDW\RXIHHOLWZDVWKHRQO\SRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQRIWKH
evidence heard? 
.54***   .39*** 
+RZFRQVLVWHQWZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVZLWKWKHHYLGHQFHSUHVHQWHGRYHUDOO" .38**   .63*** 
15. Overall, how much do you believe WKHGHIHQGDQW¶Vversion of events? .74***   .47*** 
16. Finally, how confident are you overall that you have reached the correct verdict decision in this case? .01 .84***   
 
Note. Factor loadings are statistically significant at * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. CONF = Decision Confidence; COMP = Complainant Believability; DEF 
= Defendant Believability.
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Table 5 
 
Standardized Factor Loadings for the Three JDS Factors and General Factor (G) post-deliberation (VD2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Factor loadings are statistically significant at * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. CONF = Decision Confidence; COMP = Complainant Believability; DEF 
= Defendant Believability.  
 
MCSI-R items G CONF COMP DEF 
1. Thinking DERXW\RXULQGLYLGXDOYHUGLFWGHFLVLRQRIµJXLOW\¶RUµQRWJXLOW\¶KRZFRQILGHQWDUH\RXWKDW\RX
have made the correct decision? 
.11 .76***   
2. How well did the evidence match and cover what the complainant said happened? .39***  .62***  
3. How FRPSOHWHZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVWRU\LQWKHVHQVHWKDWQRDVSHFWVZHUHPLVVLQJRUOHIWXQVXSSRUWHG
by the evidence? 
.29**  .79***  
+RZSODXVLEOHZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVLQWKDW\RXWKLQNZKDWWKH\VDLGKDSSHQHGLVERWK
possible and likely?  
.76***  .37***  
 +RZFRKHUHQWZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVWRU\PHDQLQJWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQWVWDJHVGHVFULEHGDVKDSSHQLQJZHUH
logically connected? 
.41***  .51***  
+RZXQLTXHZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VDFFRXQWLQWKDW\RXIHHOLWZDVWKHRQO\SRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQRIWKH
evidence heard? 
.47***  .57***  
+RZFRQVLVWHQWZDVWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVZLWKWKHHYLGHQFHSUHVHQWHGRYHUDOO" .63***  .49***  
8. Overall, how much do you believe WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶Vversion of events? .83***  .35***  
9. How well did the evidence match and cover what the defendant said happened? .30***   .67*** 
+RZFRPSOHWHZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWRU\LQWKHVHQVHWKDWQRDVSHFWVZHUHPLVVLQJRUOHIWXQVXSSRUWHGE\
the evidence? 
.24***   .72*** 
+RZSODXVLEOHZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶Vversion of events, in that you think what they said happened, is both 
possible and likely? 
.48***   .66*** 
+RZFRKHUHQWZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVWRU\PHDQLQJWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQWVWDJHVGHVFULEHGDVKDSSHQLQJZHUH
logically connected? 
.17*   .76*** 
13. +RZXQLTXHZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDFFRXQWLQWKDW\RXIHHOLWZDVWKHRQO\SRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQRIWKH
evidence heard? 
.41***   .53*** 
+RZFRQVLVWHQWZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWVZLWKWKHHYLGHQFHSUHVHQWHGRYHUDOO" .32***   .72*** 
15. Overall, how much do you believe WKHGHIHQGDQW¶Vversion of events? .63***   .62*** 
16. Finally, how confident are you overall that you have reached the correct verdict decision in this case? .12 .92***   
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Table 6 
Associations between the three JDS Factors and External Variables.   
 Verdict Decision 1 Verdict Decision 2 
 
Variable 
Guilty Verdict                  
(Ȥ2 = 236.50, p < .05) 
OR (95% CI) 
AMMSA (F [3, 319] = 
11.61, p < .001) 
ȕ (95% CI) 
Guilty Verdict              
(Ȥ2 = 190.10, p < .001) 
OR (95% CI) 
AMMSA (F [3, 319] = 
12.76, p < .001) 
ȕ (95% CI) 
Decision Confidence 1.13 (.88/1.45) -0.03 (-.13/.08) 1.03 (.84/1.27) 0.01 (-.11/.11) 
Complainant Believability  1.62*** (1.45/1.81) -0.16** (-.27/-.05) 1.45*** (1.32/1.59) -0.24*** (-.35/-.12) 
Defendant Believability 0.68*** (.60/.76) 0.23*** (.11/.34) 0.78*** (.71/.85) 0.16** (.04/.27) 
 
Note: Verdict Decision 1 = Individual Verdict decision 1 (made pre-deliberation); Verdict Decision 2 = Individual Verdict decision 2 (made post-
deliberation); Guilty Verdict = Individual juror guilty verdict selections; AMMSA = Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression total score; ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001
Running head: JUROR DECISION SCALE 
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